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REGULATORY STATUS OF VOIP IN THE POSTBRAND XWORLD
Jerry Elligt & Alastair Wallingtt
Abstract
During the past several years, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) has engaged in a series of rulemakings to
determine the regulatory status of Voice over Internet Protocol
(VolP). The Supreme Court's recent decision in the consolidated
cases of National Cable and Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X
and FCC v. Brand X clarifies that even if the FCC's determination
conflicts with that of a court, the FCCsjudgment holds sway as long
as the decision is reasonable. We believe that VoIP should be
classified as an
information service, rather than a
telecommunications service, for several reasons. First, the Internet
Protocol nature of VoIP technology means that it functions like an
information service, rather than a telecommunications service.
Second, in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress clearly
sought to bring competition to all communications markets;
encouraging the development of VoIP by classifying it as an
information service comports with congressional intent. Third,
economic analysis demonstrates that subjecting VoIP to the full
panoply of regulation under Title II of the Telecommunications Act
would significantly reduce consumer welfare. Fourth, the FCC' own
experience shows that, if the FCC believes that some selective
regulation is necessary, it has ample authority to impose targeted
regulation without subjecting VoIP to all regulations that affect
telecommunications services.
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INTRODUCTION
"VoIP is clearly not your father's telephone service."'
-Michael K. Powell, Former Chairman, FCC

During the past several years, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) has engaged in a series of rulemakings to
determine how services and applications that make use of Internet
Protocol ("IP-enabled services") should be regulated.2 Such services
and applications include instant messaging, interactive games,
gambling, virtual private networks, maps, various video services, and
perhaps most significantly, Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP"). IPenabled services, including VoIP, travel over the Internet or over
private communications networks, but they all function by utilizing
Internet Protocol to transfer individually addressed packets of data
over communications networks.3 This contrasts with traditional
telephone service, which typically requires a dedicated path between
4
the users for the entire duration of the call.
VoIP creates a particularly interesting quandary. Like e-mail, file
retrieval, video, and other information services, it involves the
transfer of bits across a communications network. 5 In addition, VoIP
that connects with the rest of the telephone network is a much closer
substitute for ordinary landline telephony than these other information
services, and hence it holds greater potential to erode revenues for
both local and long-distance telephone service.6 Faced with these
realities, the FCC could arguably classify VoIP as a regulated
telecommunications service, or it could allow VoIP to develop freely
as an information service. If the FCC decides VoIP is a
telecommunications service, VoIP could be subject to extensive

1.

In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling that AT&T's Phone-to-Phone IP Telephony

Services are Exempt from Access Charges, 19 F.C.C.R. 7457, 7475 (2004) [hereinafter AT&T]
(statement of FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell).
2. For a complete summary of past and pending legal and regulatory actions see In re
IP-Enabled Services, 19 F.C.C.R. 4863 (2004) [hereinafter IP-Enabled Services].
3. Id. 12, at 4874.
4. Id. 8, at 4869.
5. Id.IN9-10, at 4870-73.
6. Id. 16, at 4876. This paragraph also notes that providers of other IP-enabled
services, such as instant messaging and gaming, are also incorporating voice features. To the
extent that these voice components serve as a substitute for local or long-distance phone calls,
they may raise some of the same issues as Intemet-Protocol telephony. Id.
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carrier under Title II of the
regulation as a common
7
Telecommunications Act.
Recent court decisions establish that the FCC's determination is
indeed the critical one that will govern the regulatory status of VoIP.
In particular, the Brand X decision clarifies that even if the FCC's
determination conflicts with that of a court, the FCC's judgment holds
sway as long as the decision is reasonable.8 Furthermore, the FCC
retains wide latitude to change its mind.
We believe that VoIP should be classified as an information
service, for several reasons. First, the Internet Protocol nature of VoIP
technology means that it functions like an information service, rather
the
in
Second,
service.
telecommunications
a
than
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress clearly sought to bring
competition to all communications markets; encouraging the
development of VoIP by classifying it as an information service
comports with congressional intent. Third, economic analysis
demonstrates that subjecting VoIP to the full panoply of
Title II regulation would significantly reduce consumer welfare.
Fourth, the FCC's own experience shows that, if the FCC believes
that some selective regulation is necessary, it has ample authority to
impose targeted regulation without making VoIP subject to all Title II
regulations.
Section II of this Article explains the difference between VoIP
and regular telephone service, and between telecommunications and
information services. Section III outlines relevant FCC precedents,
which strongly suggest that VoIP should be considered an
information service. Section VI shows why the FCC's decision will
almost certainly be the definitive statement on the subject, regardless
of whether the FCC follows its own precedents. Section V shows how
classifying VoIP as an information service is consistent with
congressional intent and consumer welfare. Section VI summarizes
and concludes.
II. WHEN IS A PHONE CALL NOT TELECOMMUNICATIONS?
Traditional Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS) involves using
circuit switching to the public switched telephone network (PSTN)
operated by local telephone companies. 9 As the name suggests, a
7.

Id. 42, at 4892-93.

8.
Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs. and Fed. Conmc'n
Conm'n v. Brand X, 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699 (2005) [hereinafter BrandX].
9.
Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utilities Conm'n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993, 995
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direct, continuous connection or circuit is used for making calls.1 °
VoIP uses "packet" rather than circuit switching.'1 The call is broken
down into little packets of digital bits and transported over the
Internet. 12 The individual packets need not follow each other like a
parade of earth-bound circus elephants but can fly, like Dumbo, over
an incalculable number of Internet paths of least resistance. If
compared to the transportation of oil, PSTN resembles placing crude
in a pipeline, while VoIP would be akin to separating it into several
batches and sending it out on railcars or tanker trucks. Broadband
Internet telephone companies, such as Vonage, typically offer
software that enables the conversion of circuit switching into packet
switching and vice versa. Using this technology, calls could go from
computer to computer or from phone to computer or computer to
phone over the Internet. 13 VoIP looks and sounds like a conventional
phone call but functions completely differently. While VoIP and
POTS accomplish the same ends, their similarities parallel those of a
bicycle to an airplane-both will take you places, but a bicycle is not
an airplane and an airplane is not a bicycle.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 rarely mentions
telephones,
but
it
extensively
reforms
regulation
of
telecommunications. 14
Traditional
POTS
is
considered
telecommunications.15 Congress defined "telecommunications" as
"the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of
information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or
content of the information as sent and received."1 6 A
"telecommunications service" is "the offering of telecommunications
for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be
effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities
used." 17 If a system falls within the definition of telecommunications,
then it is classified as a common carrier and regulated under Title II
of the Telecommunications Act.1 8 Title II consists of an exhaustive

(D. Minn. 2003).

10.
11.
12.

Id.
Id.
Id.

13.

Id.

14.

See Telecom Reform: It Ain't Over 'Til It's Over, 142 CONG. REc. 2207 (1996)

(statement of Sen. Pressler).
15.
16.

See Vonage Holdings Corp., 290 F. Supp. 2d at 994-95.
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2000) (emphasis added).

17.

47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2000).

18.

IP-Enabled Services, supra note 2,

25, at 4879-80,

46 at 4895.
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list of costly and intrusive regulations, but they can be avoided if a
service manages to have itself classified as an information,1 9 rather
than telecommunications service.
Congress defined "information service" as "the offering of a
capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing,
retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not
include any use of any such capability for the management, control,
or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a
telecommunications service. ,,20
Although Congress formalized the definition of information
systems in the 1996 Act, the FCC had long been trying to delineate
the rapidly growing world of information systems from traditional
telecommunications. 21 In its 1980 Computer 1122 decision, the FCC
began addressing the regulatory challenges posed by the growing
interaction between telecommunications and computers. 23 The
Commission first distinguished between "basic services" and
"enhanced services." Basic services would continue to be regulated as
common carriers under Title II of the Communications Act, but
enhanced services would not. 24 The concept of basic service was
limited to a common carrier offering transmission capacity for the
25
movement of information without net change in form or content.
Enhanced services combined basic services with computer processing
applications that act on the "format, content, code, protocol or similar
aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information, or provide the
19.
Although information services are commonly considered free from the threat of
regulations, this is not completely accurate. Classification as an information service merely
shields a carrier from the congressionally mandated common carrier regulations in Title II of the
Telecommunications Act. The FCC does have the power to impose additional regulations on
information services under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction. However, the traditionally
competitive nature of information services has long persuaded the Commission to traditionally
leave them alone. See BrandX, 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2696 (2005) (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-161

(2000)).
20. 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000).
25-27, at 4879-81.
21. See IP-Enabled Services, supra note 2,
22. In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules & Regulations
(Second Computer Inquiry), Tentative Decision & Further Notice of Inquiry & Rulemaking, 72
F.C.C.2d 358 (1979); In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules &
Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Final Decision 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) [hereinafter
Computer II], affd sub noma.Computer & Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
14-15, at 389-90.
23. Computer II,supra note 22,
24. Id. 7, at 387.
25.

419-22).

AT&T, supra note 1,

4, at 7459 (citing Computer II, supra note 22,

93-99, at
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subscriber additional, different, or restructured information,
or
' 26
involve subscriber interaction with stored information."
Enhanced service not only included basic service, but the
presence of the former "contaminated" the definition of the latter.27 In
1988, the FCC ruled that the presence of an enhanced component
"contaminates" the basic component and "the entire offering is
28
therefore considered to be enhanced.,
In a 1998 report to Congress, the FCC found that "Congress
intended the categories of 'telecommunications service' and
'information service' to parallel the definitions of 'basic service' and
'enhanced service.'... '' 29 So the legal definition of VolP depends
upon whether or not it more closely resembles the
basic/telecommunications services or enhanced/information services
definitions as laid down by Congress and the FCC.
The language in these definitions is both technical and
complicated but extremely important. Their semantic baggage carries
far-reaching ramifications for numerous corporations, investors, and
consumers. In short, splitting hairs over words and definitions is
worth billions of dollars. If VolP is classified as a
"telecommunications service," then those providing it become
common carriers and fall under Title II of the Telecommunications
Act. As the FCC noted in its AT&T decision, common carrier status
imposes significant regulatory burdens:
Title II of the Communications Act imposes certain requirements
on common carriers, including requiring carriers to provide service
on just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates and terms; to
comply with tariffing requirements for dominant carriers; to meet
certain certification and discontinuance requirements; to comply
with interconnection obligations; to contribute to the universal
service fund; to provide access to law enforcement for authorized
wiretapping pursuant to CALEA, the Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act; to comply with disability accessibility
30
requirements; and to comply with privacy requirements.

26. Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993, 997
n.2 (2003) (quoting Computer II, supra note 22, 5, at 387).
27. See IP-Enabled Services, supra note 2, 25, at 4879-80.
28.
Vonage Holdings Corp., 290 F. Supp. 2d at 998 n.3 (quoting In re Amendment of
Sections 64.702 of the Commissions Rules & Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry) 3 F.C.C.R.
1150, 1170 n.23 (1988)).
29. In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501,
21, at
11511 (1998) [hereinafter Universal Service Report].
30. AT&T, supra note 1, at 7460 n. 16 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-276 (2000)).
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The regulatory burdens of Title II are heavy. Definition as a
telecommunications service means comprehensive government
oversight, mandates, and compliance. A common carrier subject to
Title II regulation must obtain FCC approval before starting or
discontinuing service, may be subject to price regulation (unless the
FCC decides it is a nondominant carrier), must interconnect with
other carriers at FCC-determined rates, must contribute to the federal
universal service fund, and must configure its network to comply with
various public safety obligations.3 1 While traditional telephone
service is clearly a telecommunications service, the competitive
nature of computer-driven information services has led to them being
classified separately and left relatively unregulated.
III. PRECEDENTS FOR DECLARING VOIP AN INFORMATION
SERVICE
Congress defined telecommunications and information services
before VoIP became viable, which meant that legislators wrote the
1996 Act without contemplating an information service that might
serve as a close substitute for a traditional telecommunications
service.
The difference is easily illustrated by a comparison to shipping
oil. If a Texas oilman wants to send one hundred barrels of oil from
his well in Texas to a refinery in New Jersey, he can choose a
pipeline, barge, tanker trucks, or railroad. If he chooses a pipeline, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) will regulate the
movement. The railroads fall under the Surface Transportation Board
(STB), while the Coast Guard looks after oil barges, and trucking has
been largely deregulated. The end result is that oil will go from point
A to point B, but the method of delivery may vary. Who regulates and
what rules apply do not depend upon what is being done but how it is
being done. If he sends his oil in a continuous stream over pipelines,
then FERC regulates the rate paid. However, if he decides to bundle
his oil into batches and send it in tanker trucks, then he will pay the
going market rate-sans regulation.
The same has become true for phone calls. If our oilman wants
to call New Jersey and check if his oil has arrived, his words can
either go out over phone lines in a continuous stream, or they can be
bundled up into little packets of data and transferred over the Internet.
If his call goes out via the traditional method, then it is a

31.

47 U.S.C. §§ 201-267 (2000).
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"telecommunications service" and subject to regulation. Use of the
latter method should be classified as an "information service" and left
relatively unregulated. Why would Congress choose to regulate one
32
method and not the other? The answer is that Congress really didn't.
VoIP largely evolved after passage of the Telecommunications Act of
1996. However, the fashion in which the Act separates
telecommunications and information services most likely places VoIP
in the latter category. VoIP looks like a duck and quacks like a duck
but legally isn't a duck.
A.

State Litigation

Several states have already attempted to regulate VoIP and been
taken to court, but the designation of a VolP service has only been
completely litigated once. 33 In 2003, the Minnesota Public Utilities
Commission (MPUC) attempted to impose state telephone regulations
34
on Vonage Holdings Corporation, which sued for an injunction.
Federal District Judge Michael Davis ruled VoIP an information
service.35 Furthermore, he held that Congress has expressed a clear
intent to leave the Internet unregulated, and, since the Internet forms
the backbone of VolP service, the federal regulatory vacuum
preempted any state attempt at regulation.3 6 One might think that this
ruling should have effectively immunized VoIP from both federal and
state regulation. Following the case, the FCC issued a declaratory
ruling preempting the MPUC from imposing any restriction on
Vonage. 37 The district court and the FCC effectively precluded the

32. See In re Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning
an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission., 19 F.C.C.R. 22404, 14, at 22411-12
(2004) [hereinafter Order] (citing Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56 (1996)).
33. Id. 13, at 22410-11.
34. Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993 (2003).
35. Id.at 1002.
36. Id. at 997, 1002-03.
37. Order, supra note 32, 1, at 22404. The MPUC appealed the case but was forbidden
from bringing a collateral attack on the FCC's ruling. In order to challenge the FCC, the MPUC
would have to file a separate petition for review under the Hobbs Act and name the United
States as a party. This made the declaratory ruling binding on the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Since the declaratory ruling and the district court both held that state law had been
preempted and the court of appeals could not review the declaratory ruling (because of the
prohibition on collateral attacks), it had no choice but to affirm the district court. The MPUC
could still challenge the FCC's declaratory ruling, but it would have to start over again and sue
the United States under Hobbs Act jurisdiction. See Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minn. Pub.
Utilities Comm'n, 394 F.3d 568, 569 (8th Cir. 2004).
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State of Minnesota from imposing regulations, but the Vonage
decision is unlikely to place any restraints on the FCC.
While the FCC's declaratory ruling agreed with the district court
on the issue of preemption, it declined to determine whether VolP
was a telecommunications or information service. 38 The district court
has been affirmed, so VolP is an information service in the Eighth
Circuit, but the final legal status of VoIP remains far from settled. The
recent Brand X decision implies that, even if the legal designation of
VolP pops up in courtrooms all over the country, the final decision
will lie with the FCC. Every single federal district and circuit court in
the nation could rule that VolP is an information service, only to be
simultaneously overruled by the FCC.
The drafters of the Telecommunications Act defined
telecommunications and information services without contemplating
VoIP, which in 1996 appeared decades and many solved problems
away from viability. The term itself did not even exist until 1995. 39
Rapid advances in technology made VolP marketable, creating
telephone service that resembled telecommunications in form but
functioned like an information service. In Vonage Holdings Corp. v.
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, a federal district court
wrestled with this problem and was left trying to decide which hole
was the least misshaped to handle the VolP peg.4 °
While VoIP may clearly look like telecommunications or basic
service, the definitions given by Congress and the FCC ensure that it
is not. As defined by Congress, telecommunications involves the
transmission of information "without change in the form or content."
41 VolP cannot be telecommunications, because, unlike circuit
switching, VolP involves transforming information into small packets
of bytes.42 The change in "form" prevents VolP from being defined as
telecommunications, but, more importantly, the workings of VolP
more closely resemble the definition of an information service. VoIP
makes the transmission of information over the Internet possible. In
other words, it allows "the offering of a capability for generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or
making available information via telecommunications. '' 43
38.
39.

Order, supra note 32, 14, at22411.
Paula K. Royalty, When is a Phone CallNot a Phone Call? Legal Issues Arisingfrom

Business Use of VoIP, I SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 1,

40.
41.
42.
43.

1 (2004).

Vonage Holdings Corp., 290 F. Supp. 2d 993.
47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2000).
Vonage Holdings Corp., 290 F. Supp. 2d at 995.
47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000).
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The legal definition of VoIP becomes even clearer when the
FCC's definition of "enhanced service" is paralleled with the
congressional definition of "information service." Enhanced services
include basic services just as information services include "making
information available via telecommunications."" Therefore, the
presence of a basic service or the use of telecommunications in an
enhanced or information service does not make a telecommunications
service. Furthermore, the definition of enhanced service includes
certain magic words associated with VoIP. 45 Even if a VoIP call goes
out over a telephone line onto the Internet, it still combines the use of
a basic service with the computer processing needed to make the call
happen.46 VoIP may not change the "content" of the information, but
it arguably changes the "format," "code," "protocol," "or similar
aspects of the subscriber's information., 47 Agreeing with the parallels
between the two sets of definitions, the Court in Vonage closely
followed the FCC's language:
The process of transmitting customer calls over the Internet
requires Vonage to "act on" the format and protocol of the
information. For calls originating with one of Vonage's customers,
calls in the VoIP format must be transformed into the format of the
PSTN before a POTS user can receive the call. For calls
originating with one of Vonage's customers, calls in the VoIP
format must be transformed into the format of the PSTN before a
POTS user can receive the call. For calls originating from a POTS
user, the process of acting on the format and protocol is reversed.
The Court concludes that Vonage's activities fit within the
definition of information services. Vonage's services are closely
tied to the provision of telecommunications services as defined by
Congress, the courts and the FCC, but this Court finds that Vonage
48
uses telecommunications services, rather than provides them.

44. Id.
45.
Enhanced services are defined as "services, offered over common carrier transmission
facilities used in interstate communications, which employ computer processing applications
that act on the format, content, code, protocol, or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted
information." 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (2005); Universal Service Report, supra note 29,
21, at
11511 (stating that the definition for enhanced services parallels the definition of information

services).
46. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (2005); Universal Service Report, supra note 29,
11511.
47.

21, at

See 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a).

48. Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 290
(D. Minn. 2003) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Of course,
companies use computers too, but their use is limited to the capability
control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the

F. Supp. 2d 993, 999
traditional telephone
for the management,
management of a
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The Court noted that there are three forms of Internet Protocol
(IP) telephony: (1) computer-to-computer, (2) telephone-to-computer,
and (3) telephone-to-telephone. 49 In its Universal Service Report, the
FCC only examined phone-to-phone and computer-to-computer.5 0
While the FCC declined to explicitly classify either type, it did
tentatively conclude that phone-to-phone IP telephony "lacks the
characteristics that would render them 'information services' within
the meaning of the statute, and instead bear the characteristics of
'telecommunications services."' 5 1 The FCC declined to make a firm
determination but did provide a set of conditions to determine
whether a provider's offering constituted phone-to-phone telephony.
In using the term "phone-to-phone" IP telephony, we tentatively
intend to refer to services in which the provider meets the
following conditions: (1) it holds itself out as providing voice
telephony or facsimile transmission service; (2) it does not require
the customer to use CPE different from that CPE necessary to
place an ordinary touch-tone call (or facsimile transmission) over
the public switched telephone network; (3) it allows the customer
to call telephone numbers assigned in accordance with the North
American Numbering Plan, and associated international
agreements; and (4) it transmits
customer information without net
52
change in form or content.
The Court concluded that Vonage did not meet the second or
fourth conditions.53 CPE stands for "customer premises equipment,"
and the CPE needed to place a call over the Internet differs from the
equipment used to place a normal POTS call. 4 The definition
suggests that even what looks like a traditional phone-to-phone call
may not be classified as telecommunications, provided the customer
uses different CPE, such as a computer or broadband modem, or the
change in format occurs on the customer's premises.

telecommunications service, which is specifically placed outside of the definition of an
information system. This language had been added to the definition in order to allow the carriers
to modernize the provision and use of basic services. See In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling
that pulver.com's Free World Dialup is Neither Telecommunications Nor a Telecommunications
Service, 19 F.C.C.R. 3307, 1 13, at 3314-15 (2004) [hereinafter Pulver].
49. Vonage Holdings Corp., 290 F. Supp. 2d, 993, 999 n.9.
50. Id. at 999.
51. Universal Service Report, supra note 29, 89, at 11544.
52. Id. 88, at 11543-44.
53.
Vonage Holdings Corp., 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1000.
54. Id. at 995.

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

100

[Vol. 23

B. Direct FCCDecisions on VoIP
Although the FCC has yet to specifically address the VoIP
question raised in Vonage, its prior decisions regarding different
forms of VoIP technology, such as phone-to-phone Internet telephony
and computer-to-computer IP telephony, would appear to light the
way towards an outcome similar to Vonage.
1. Phone-to-Phone: AT&T
Classifying a telephone call as an information service depends
on equipment used by the customer and/or whether or not a net
change in form or content occurs.55 A telephone company cannot
avoid regulation simply by routing part of a call over the Internet. The
key element is the "net" change in form or content.56 In re Petitionfor
Declaratory Ruling that AT&T's Phone-to-Phone IP Telephony
Services are Exempt from Access Charges addressed the issue of
telephone companies attempting to skirt regulation by channeling part
of their calls through the Internet. 57 AT&T took calls over ordinary
phone lines and transformed them into IP format once they reached
their network.58 The carrier then shunted long distance calls over the
Internet before converting them back into POTS format and
channeling them through a local exchange carrier. 59 The only
difference in AT&T's method from a normal circuit-switched
telephone call was its long distance routing over the Internet, rather
than its traditional long distance circuit-switched network.60 Under
this system, AT&T would pay local exchange carrier (LEC) access
charges on the caller's end, but terminate the call to the receiving
LEC's switch through local business lines, which allowed them to
avoid termination charges.61
AT&T's antics forced the Commission to classify these calls as
telecommunications, but the FCC was very careful to narrowly apply
the definition to an interexchange service that: "(1) uses ordinary
customer premises equipment (CPE) with no enhanced functionality;
(2) originates and terminates on the public switched telephone
network (PSTN); and (3) undergoes no net protocol conversion and

55.

AT&T, supra note 1,

56.

Id.

57.

Id.

58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id. 11 at 7464.

61.

Id.

1, at 7457.
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provides no enhanced 6functionality
to end users due to the provider's
2
use of IP technology.,
The Commission went on to classify its ruling as a "stop gap"
measure that was "in no way intend[ed] to preclude the Commission
from adopting a different approach when it resolves the IP-Enabled
Services rulemaking proceeding or the Intercarrier Compensation
rulemaking proceeding." 63 In other words, when forced to make a
decision, the Commission chose the narrowest ruling possible, and
even shied away from making a firm pronouncement. It only stated
that the exact form of phone-to-phone IP telephony used by AT&T
lacked the characteristics of an information service and bore the
characteristics of a telecommunications service.64 Despite the narrow
and soft language the Commission deemed this a telecommunications
service because:
End-user customers do not order a different service, pay different
rates, or place and receive calls any differently than they do
through AT&T's traditional circuit-switched long distance service;
the decision to use its Intemet backbone to route certain calls is
made internally by AT&T. To the extent that protocol conversions
associated with AT&T specific service take place within its
network, they appear to be "intemetworking" conversions, which
65
the Commission has found to be telecommunications services.
Consequently, when a provider of IP-enabled voice services
contracts with an interexchange carrier to deliver interexchange
calls that begin on the PSTN, undergo no net protocol conversion,
and terminate on the PSTN, the interexchange
carrier is obligated
66
to pay terminating access charges.
However, while the Commission noted that AT&T's form of
phone-to-phone IP telephony was a telecommunications service and
did not meet the definition of an information service, it would be
willing to revisit its decision if the service evolved to meet the
definition of an information service.67 For example, if AT&T had cut
out the local exchange carriers and offered long distance VolP
services between customers' computers in a fashion similar to

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
21957-58).
66. Id.
67. Id.

1, at 7457-58.
2, at 7458, 10, at 7463-64.
8, at 7462.
12, at 7465 (citing Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, II F.C.C.R.
19, at 7470.
13, at 7465-66.

106, at
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Vonage, the Commission would probably not have taken such a dim
view of AT&T activities.
2.

68
Computer-to-Computer: Pulver

A federal court thought Vonage an information service.69
Meanwhile, the FCC deemed that AT&T's phone-to-phone Internet
telephony was a telecommunications service, which came roughly
two months after the FCC ruled that Pulver.com, a provider of
computer-to-computer IP telephony, was an information service.7 °
Pulver provided a service known as Free World Dialup (FWD).7 1
Once members had acquired a broadband connection and a Session
Internet Protocol (SIP) phone or software that allowed their
computers to function as "soft phones," they could obtain a five or six
digit FWD number, which allowed them to make free VoIP calls to
other Pulver members over the Internet.72 Through its server, Pulver
let members know which members were available to talk, how to
contact members, and membership could include a voicemail feature
if requested.7 3 Pulver possessed no transmission facilities of its own
but essentially made it possible for people to talk to each other over
the Internet.74
The Commission pointed out that Pulver may "use" some
telecommunications to provide its FWD directory service but that did
not make FWD itself telecommunications.7 5 Furthermore, as its name
suggests, FWD is free of charge to users, and in order to be a
telecommunications service, the service provider must assess a fee for
its service.7 6 However, while this was certainly a factor in the FCC's
decision, it was by no means dispositive.77 The Commission could
have halted its analysis with this point, but, instead, chose to continue.
Although Pulver provided its members with voice
communications over long distances, the FCC rejected "looks and
quacks like a duck" arguments comparing computer to computer IP
68. See Pulver, supra note 48.
69. See Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993 (D.
Minn.2003).
70. Pulver, supra note 48, 26, at 3324.
71. Id. 1,at3307.
72. Id. 5, at 3309-10.
73. Id. 11, at 3313.
74. Id. 7, at 3311.
75. Id. 9, at 3312.
76. Id. 10, at 3312-13.
77. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2000) (definition of"telecommunications service")).
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telephony to traditional telephone service and stuck to the statutory
definitions:
The fact that the information service Pulver is offering happens to
facilitate a direct disintermediated voice communication, among
other types of communications, in a peer-to-peer exchange cannot
and does not remove it from the statutory definition of information
service and place it within, for example, the definition of
telecommunications service. To find otherwise would not only
ignore the fact that Pulver does not provide telecommunications, as
explained above, but also ignore the capabilities
described above
78
that FWD makes available to its members.
For reasons provided herein, that FWD happens to, among other
things, enable members to talk over the Internet, as opposed to
play video games, for example, does not affect out conclusion that
FWD is most aplropriately characterized as an unregulated
information service.
The Pulver decision suggests that any future definition of VoIP
services will depend upon how a system operates and not what it
accomplishes. The fact that a service provides voice communications
over long distances is largely irrelevant. This should leave most VoIP
services unregulated. With this in mind, the FCC would be more
likely to regulate a couple of children communicating through two tin
cans joined with 80string than millions of consumers calling each other
over the Internet.
C. The FCC's TraditionalDefinitions
A federal district court has defined VolP as an information
service in Vonage.8 1 The FCC classified a very narrow form of VoIP
as telecommunications in AT&T, but if Pulver is followed, then most
VolP services should be classified as information services. However,
the FCC is not as rigidly tied to its precedents as the courts. The
Commission may change its mind as long as it does not act arbitrarily
or capriciously and is not hemmed in by unambiguous statutory
language.82 This is not to suggest that the FCC does not adhere to its
78. Id. 12, at 3314.
79. Id. 19, at 3320.
80. The hypothetical of the two children and the tin can phone would, of course, also
require that the string stretch over a state line (47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2000)) and one child charge
the other for its use (47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2000)).
81.
Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993 (D.
Minn. 2003).
82. "Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency's
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previous decisions, but that inconsistencies need only be explained,
and even a lack of explanation may fail to invalidate some changes.83
As we observed in Section II, the FCC considers its definitions
of basic and enhanced services as synonyms for the statutory terms of
telecommunications and information systems.84 A basic service is
transmission capacity for the movement of information without net
change in form or content. 85 An enhanced service contains a basic
service component but also involves some degree of data processing
86
that changes the form or content of the transmitted information.
Generally, services that result in a protocol conversion are enhanced
services, while services that result in no net protocol conversion to the
end user are basic services. 87 Since the Commission found that the
enhanced service market was highly competitive and subject to low
barriers to entry, it decided not to treat providers of enhanced services
as common carriers subject to regulation under Title II of the
Communications Act. 88 Apparently approving of the Commission's
action, Congress later spelled out this policy explicitly, lest the FCC
ever change its mind.89
Like basic services and enhanced services, telecommunications
services and information services are separate and distinct categories,
with Title II regulation applying to telecommunications services but
not to information services. 90 The Commission also found that
services that involve no net protocol conversion are
.

interpretation under the Chevron framework. Unexplained inconsistency is, at most, a reason for
holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice under
the Administrative Procedure Act. For if the agency adequately explains the reasons for a
reversal of policy, 'change is not invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron is to leave the
discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency.' 'An initial
agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone."' BrandX, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 2699-2700
(2005) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
83.
Id.
84.
AT&T, supra note 1, 6, at 7460-61 (citing Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, 11
F.C.C.R. 21905,
102-107, at 21955-58 (1996); Federal-State Joint Board on Universal
Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501,
13, at 11507-08,
33, at 11516-17 (1998) [hereinafter Stevens
Report]).

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. 4, at 7459 (citing Computer II, supra note 22,
93-99 at 419-22.).
Id. (citing Computer II, supra note 22, 97, at 420-21.).
Id.
Id. 4, at 7460, (citing Computer II, supra note 22,
126-132, at 432-35).

89.
See Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993,
998-99 (D. Minn. 2003) (citing 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (2005)).
90.
AT&T, supra note 1,
11507-08).

6, at 7461 (citing Stevens Report, supra note 84,

13, at
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telecommunications services rather than information services under
the 1996 Act definitions. 9'
With respect to protocol conversion and phone-to-phone
services, the Commission noted in the Stevens Report and its NonAccounting Safeguards Order that "certain protocol processing
services that result in no net protocol conversion to the end user are
classified as basic services; those services are deemed
telecommunications services. '92 The Commission further stated,
"[t]he protocol processing that takes place incident to phone-to-phone
IP telephony does not affect the service's classification, under the
Commission's current approach,
because it results in no net protocol
93
user."
end
the
to
conversion
In the case of computer-to-computer telephony, users placed
calls over the. Internet using software and hardware at their
premises.9 4 These calls went out over an unregulated Internet Service
Provider (ISP), and the ISP may not even have been aware that a
voice call was taking place. 95 Thus, the Commission concluded that
the ISP was not providing communications service to its
subscribers.96
If the FCC's prior rulings and traditional definitions are any
indication, forms of VoIP that involve the conversion of calls into IPenabled format at the consumer's premises should be classified as
enhanced/information services. In order to avoid the costs of
regulation, a consumer need only convert his call into IP format
through his computer or possess some sort of device that
accomplishes the same ends and is not ordinary telephone CPE.
Pulver.com and AT&T both sent telephone calls over the
Internet, but the FCC deemed one a telecommunications service and
the other an information service. These two declaratory rulings have
established the telecommunications and information services
extremes of VolP. The space in between remains to be filled.

91. Id. (citing Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 21905,
106, at 2195758). Similarly, the Commission found that certain classes of "expected" protocol processing
services are telecommunications services as well. Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, 11
F.C.C.R. 21905, 106, at 21957-58.
92. AT&T, supra note 1, 7, at 7461 (citing Stevens Report, supra note 84, 50, at
11526).
93. Id. (citing Stevens Report, supranote 84, 52, at 11527).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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If the FCC was a court and forced to follow its own legal
precedents, then most VoIP would likely be defined as information
services and left unregulated. However, BrandX illuminates a double
proposition: (1) the FCC's determination of ambiguous statutory
language may conflict with that of the courts provided it 97is
reasonable; and (2) the Commission remains free to change it mind.
Is it reasonable to think of VoIP as an information service? The
answer is yes. Is it reasonable to think of VolP as a
telecommunications service? The answer is also yes. Like the federal
district court in the Vonage case, a judicial determination, closely
following
the
statutory
and
FCC
definitions
of
telecommunications/basic and information/enhanced services would
probably rule most VoIP as information services. But the FCC is not a
court, so any decision lies purely within its discretion. Therefore, the
FCC remains free to make its decision in a legal vacuum.
IV. THE MEANING OF BRAND X: WHY THE FCC WILL HAVE
THE FINAL SAY
Whatever the correct legal definition of VoIP, the Supreme
Court's recent decision in the consolidated Brand X cases 98 all but
ensures that the FCC will have the final say on the matter. Press
coverage surrounding BrandX framed the decision as if the Supreme
Court had decided that cable companies were not common carriers
and therefore did not have to share their lines with others.99 While this
was the de facto outcome of the decision, the Court did not
specifically rule on this issue. 0 0 Brand X revolved around the
classification of high-speed broadband Internet connections over
cable lines.' 0 If the FCC classified broadband cable modem service
as a telecommunications service, then the cable companies'
broadband lines would become common carriers and fall under the
extensive regulations in Title II of the Communications Act.
However, the FCC decided that cable modem broadband resembled
an information service, which shielded it from common carrier status
02
and regulation.'

97.

See BrandX, 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699-2700 (2005).

98.

BrandX, 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005).

99.

See Yuki Noguchi, Cable FirmsDon't Have to Share Networks, Court Rules, WASH.

POST, June 28, 2005, at DOI.

100.
101.
102.

BrandX, 125 S. Ct. at 2712.
Id. at 2688.
See id. at 2698.
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The FCC's determination was challenged in court, and a judicial
lottery assigned it to the Ninth Circuit.10 3 Unfortunately for the FCC,
a previous Ninth Circuit case, AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland,10 4 had
already classified cable modem broadband as a telecommunications
service. 0 5 So the issue litigated was not the legal disposition of
broadband cable modem service, but rather whether the final say
belonged to the FCC or to legal precedent. Under Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ,106 clear statutory
language gives agencies little deference, but ambiguous language
brings great07latitude, and an agency's interpretation need only be
reasonable. 1

However, the Ninth Circuit ignored Chevron and applied the
judicial definition of broadband cable modem service supplied by
AT&T Corp. v. City ofPortland.10 8 It reasoned that since case law had
already ruled cable modem broadband a telecommunications service,
the FCC could not say otherwise. 10 9 The Supreme Court disagreed.
According to Brand X, while a court had ruled on the issue, this did
not eliminate the agency's Chevron deference. 110 A court and an
agency could reach opposite conclusions over ambiguous language,
but, provided its conclusion was reasonable, the final, legal say fell to
the agency.'
In order for a court or precedent to trump an agency's
discretionary construction, "the court must hold that the statute
unambiguously requires the court's construction." ' 1 2 If a court

103.

Id.

104.
105.

AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
BrandX, 125 S. Ct. at 2702.

106.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

107. "In Chevron, this Court held that ambiguous language in statutes within an agency's
jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in
reasonable fashion. Filling these gaps, the Court explained, involves difficult policy choices that
agencies are better equipped to make than courts. If a statute is ambiguous, and if the
implementing agency's construction is reasonable, Chevron requires a federal court to accept the
agency's construction of the statute, even if the agency's reading differs from what the court
believes is the best statutory interpretation." Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2699 (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted).
108. Although the case defined cable modem broadband Internet service as a
telecommunications service, it did not concern the issue of agency delegation, and the FCC was
not a party. The Ninth Circuit mistakenly believed that the definition in Portlandoverrode the
contrary conclusion made by the FCC. Id. at 2698-99.
109.

Id

110.

Id. at2699.

111.

Id.

112.

Id. at 2702.
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considered the statutory language unambiguous, then its interpretation
would be binding on the Commission.'" 3 Ambiguous language would
remain the ward of the FCC, and a court might only impose on the
Commission if its construction of the language defied reasonableness,
114
which, although an ambiguous term in itself, is decidedly broad.
Even if the FCC's determination defied reasonableness, the courts
would be more likely to remand the matter back to the Commission
for another try, rather than imposing their own reasonable
interpretation.
In Brand X, the Supreme Court did not rule on whether or not
cable modem broadband was a telecommunications or information
service, but only examined whether it was reasonable for the FCC to
classify it as an information service. 1 5 Broadband cable modem
service has not been ordained an information service for all time by
the power of the United States Supreme Court, but, rather, its legal
definition lies at the pleasure of the FCC. Changing cable modem
broadband's designation to a telecommunications service would not
hinge on overturning BrandX, but would merely require a reasonable
change of heart at the FCC.16
The lesson learned from Brand X is that the FCC, and not the
courts, will make legal determinations regarding VoIP. The majority
in BrandX found it reasonable to classify cable modem broadband as
an information service,' 7 while the dissent thought it clearly a

113. See id.
114. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast Inc. v. United Distributionserves an
excellent example of the breadth of reasonableness. In this case, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) set the price ceiling for natural gas above the market price. Mobil Oil
Exploration & Producing Se. Inc. v. United Distribution, 498 U.S. 211 (1991). This move
essentially deregulated the market FERC had been charged with regulating. Id. In an 8-0
decision (Justice Kennedy took no part), the Supreme Court held FERC's conduct reasonable.
Id.
115.
See BrandX, 125 S. Ct. at 2705-06.
116. "Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency's
interpretation under the Chevron framework. Unexplained inconsistency is, at most, a reason for
holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice under
the Administrative Procedure Act. For if the agency adequately explains the reasons for a
reversal of policy, 'change is not invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron is to leave the
discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency.' 'An initial
agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency.., must
consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis,' for
example, in response to changed factual circumstances, or a change in administrations. That is
no doubt why in Chevron itself, this Court deferred to an agency interpretation that was a recent
reversal of agency policy." Id. at 2699-2700 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 2708.
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telecommunications service.1 8 True, VolP has made it into the courts
and been ruled an information service, but this is precisely the same
thing that happened in the Portlandcase, whose misapplication led to
the Ninth Circuit's reversal in Brand X It is reasonable to define
VolP as an information service, but it is also reasonable to define it as
a telecommunications service.
While both definitions fall within the cloud of reasonableness, an
examination of the potential legal definition of VolP reveals that one
is definitely more reasonable than the other. Furthermore, the
precedential pressure towards definition as an information service is
reinforced by an even more compelling consumer welfare argument,
grounded both in economic analysis and the congressional intent
underlying the Telecommunications Act.
V. VOIP SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS AN INFORMATION
SERVICE
Legal precedent and prior FCC decisions push VoIP into the
information service category, but Chevron deference prevents the deal
from sealing. In this section, we shall explore the case for classifying
VoIP as an information service by examining the intent of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the effects of various aspects of
Title II regulation on consumer welfare.
A. Intent of the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996
The clearest statement of the Telecommunications Act's intent
can be found in the preamble: "To promote competition and reduce
regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services
for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid
deployment of new telecommunications technologies."' 1 9 The courts
may find the language of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
ambiguous, 1 20 but the intent is clear. The purpose of the Act was to
deregulate, promote competition, and advance new technologies.1 2'
The law's sponsor, Senator Larry Pressler, echoed the
preamble's call for a deregulatory, pro-competition, pro-consumer

118.

Id. at 2718 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

119.

Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, pmbl. (1996).
"It would be gross understatement to say that the 1996 Act is not a model of clarity. It

120.

is in many important respects a model of ambiguity or indeed even self contradiction." AT&T v.
Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999).
121.

Telecom Reform: It Ain't Over 'Til It's Over, 142 CONG. REc. S2207 (Mar. 15, 1996)

(statement of Sen. Pressler).
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interpretation of the Act on the Senate floor and in an article
published in Roll Call.12 2 However, the senator added a cautionary
note to the FCC.123 While the FCC had been given broad discretion, it
must not lose sight of congressional intent that it should constrain
itself and not act to the detriment of consumers:
Thanks to my bill, the communications industry will see an
explosion in new investment and development. Who are the
winners? The consumers. There will be more services and new
products at lower costs. All of this economic activity will mean
new jobs. Competition is the key for this development. My bill
unlocked the regulatory handcuffs restricting the communications
industry-now, competition will bring everything from lower costs
and new products to better education opportunities to the public.
First and foremost, Congress needs to make sure that what the
American consumer won on the legislative battlefield isn't lost on
the regulatory drawing board. In other words, we need to make
sure that the FCC carries out the intent of Congress as it
implements the tenets of the Telecommunications Act.
Senator Pressler's article gives us an important insight into the
intent of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The driving force
behind the Act was the desire to foster innovation and technology
development, which should bring new services to consumers at lower
costs. Furthermore, Pressler stresses the need to remove the
"regulatory handcuffs" restricting the industry from bringing
25
competition, new products, and lower prices to consumers.1
Pressler's second comment implies that the Act was intended to
benefit consumers. Therefore, the FCC should pay very close
attention to consumer welfare when implementing its provisions.
Perhaps fearing that he had not been clear, the senator continued to
refine and simplify his remarks:
[The Telecommunications Act of 1996] is procompetitive and
deregulatory. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 will get
everybody into everybody else's business. ... It will do a great deal
for consumers. For example, and specifically, it will lower prices
on local telephone calls through competition. It will lower prices
on long-distance calls through competition. It will lower cable TV

122.

Id.

123.

Id.

124.

Id.

125.

Id.

20061
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rates through competition. It will
provide an explosion of new
1 26
devices, services and inventions.
VoIP is one of those new devices, services, and inventions.
Based on that fact alone, one might even make the argument that the
statutory language is unambiguous and denies the FCC the discretion
to impose Title II on VoIP by declaring it a telecommunications
service.
The case against Title II regulation becomes even stronger when
one realizes that original justifications for all Title II
telecommunications regulation are eroding. In AT&T v. Iowa Utilities
Board,127 Justice Scalia commented that he believed the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 reflected Congress's belief that
advances in technology had made competition among local providers
of telephone services possible, and thus, they were no longer natural
monopolies. 128 In his concurring opinion (circa 1999), Justice Breyer
wondered aloud, "Will wireless technology or cable television lines,
for example, permit the efficient provision of local telephone service
without the use of existing telephone lines that now run house to
house?"' 129 In response, Hausman and Sidak mused that such a
substitution would have the effect of rendering the unbundling of
local phone service in some geographic markets-a' 30regulation dating
from only 1996--"unnecessary and inappropriate."'
Not only did Congress write the Telecommunications Act
recognizing that one of the primary reasons for regulating telephone
service, which was natural monopoly, no longer existed, but Justice
Breyer correctly divined that the march of progress might soon
invalidate the reasons for forced unbundling or open access.
Widespread wireless and cable telephony may have seemed a long
way off in 1999, but they are a reality today. 131 VoIP enables any
cable modem user to make phone calls, without the cable company
126.
127.

142 CONG. REc. S686, 686-87 (Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Pressler).
AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).

128.
Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the
Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417, 436 (1999)

[hereinafter Hausman & Sidak].
129. Id. at 445 (citing Breyer, J., concurring).
130.

Id.
131.
Jerry Ellig, Intercarrier Compensation and Consumer Welfare, 2005 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH, & POL'Y 97, 117 (2006) [hereinafter Ellig, IntercarrierCompensation] (citing evidence

that wireless has become a substitute for wireline telephones, that the actual cost of wireless and
cable telephony in urban areas is equivalent to the actual cost ofwireline phone service, and that
telephone service packages are available from competitors in a number of cities at prices
comparable to those charged by incumbent telephone companies).
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having to make much in the way of new investment in special
equipment for cable telephony. 132 If technology has eroded much of
the need for Title II regulation of incumbents, then why should any
attempt be made at imposing it on new entrants like VoIP? At a
minimum, the legislative history suggests that Title II regulation is
unnecessary for the new technologies that the Act seeks to promote,
because these new competitors are not monopolists.
B. Economic analysis supports classifying VoIP as an
informationservice
Even if the FCC has "reasonable" discretion to decide whether
VoIP is an information or telecommunications service, we are left
with the question of what should guide regulators when they choose
among alternative interpretations that might all be considered
reasonable. The Telecommunications Act's emphasis on competition
and consumer welfare presents a significant opportunity for the FCC
to incorporate economic analysis into its decision-making. In a 1999
article concerning unbundling of local telephone service, Jerry
Hausman and J. Gregory Sidak proposed that the inaximization of
consumer welfare guide the FCC's decisions:
It does not follow, of course, that the Commission should pick any
point that lies in the zone of reasonableness along the continuum of
possible statutory interpretations. Rather, the Commission should
adopt an interpretation that represents its best efforts to identify the
optimal point along the continuum, where133"optimality" is realized
through consumer-welfare maximization.
Hausman and Sidak argued that implementing the sections of the
Telecommunications Act dealing with the open access and
unbundling of local phone service should be guided by antitrust law,
specifically, the essential facilities doctrine.1 34 Although the essential
facilities doctrine has never been formally endorsed by the Supreme
Court, it hasn't been rejected either.' 35 In AT&T v. Iowa Utilities
Board, Justices Breyer and Scalia both appeared to invite the FCC to
employ the essential facilities doctrine when formulating regulation
132. See IP-Enabled Services, supra note 2,
3-4, at 4865-67.
133. Hausman & Sidak, supra note 128, at 422 (emphasis in original).
134. Id. at 423-24.
135. Id. at 446 (citing Breyer, J., concurring). The essential facilities doctrine holds that
the owner of an essential facility should be forced to share it with his competitors if certain
conditions are met. Although a popular topic of conversation among antitrust jurists, the
Supreme Court seems content to never settle the issue and has thus maintained the cottage
industry of legal scholarship that has sprung up around it.
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dealing with open access to local telephone networks. 136 Hausman and
Sidak believe that using antitrust tools implies the primary end of
antitrust law-the maximization of consumer welfare.1 37 Regardless
of one's view of the essential facilities doctrine, Hausman and Sidak's
broader point that consumer welfare should guide regulators to the
most reasonable decision merits wider discussion. Consequently, the
following sections examine the effect on consumer welfare of
applying various aspects of Title II regulation to VoIP.
1. Price and entry regulation
It is doubtful that price and entry regulation of VoIP under Title
II would promote consumer welfare. Price regulation can improve
consumer welfare if the regulated industry is a "natural monopoly"that is, if the relationship between costs and demand makes it possible
for a single firm to serve the entire market at lower cost than multiple
firms - and if sunk costs eliminate the potential for entry.1 38 In that
139
case, price regulation may mitigate the single firm's market power.
Common carrier regulation helps assure that the firm cannot limit
output by refusing to serve some customers at the regulated price.
Entry regulation can improve consumer welfare if a natural monopoly
is "unsustainable"-that is, if a peculiar set of cost conditions would
lead to the presence of more than one firm in the market even though
a single firm can serve the entire market at lowest total cost. 140 In the
absence of monopoly, economic regulation is at best superfluous141and
at worst a source of market power and increased consumer costs.
136.
137.

Id. at422.
Id.

138.
On the role of sunk costs, see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS
AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 290-93 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.) (1982).
139.
On the potential efficiencies and pitfalls involved in regulating the price charged by a
monopolist, see ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS VOL 125-57 (JOHN WILEY & SONS, 1970).
140.

See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANZAR, AND ROBERT D. WILLIG,
MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, Inc.) (1982).
141.
For a sample of the economics literature outlining the perverse incentives created
when economic regulation substitutes for competition, see Thomas W. Hazlett, Competition vs.
Franchise Monopoly in Cable Television, 4 CONTEMP. POL'Y ISSUES 80 (1986); Thomas W.
Hazlet, Prices and Outputs Under Cable TV Reregulation, 12 J. OF REG. ECON. 173 (1997);
Thomas W. Hazlett, Spectrum FlashDance: Eli Noam's Proposalfor "Open Access" to Radio
Waves, 41 J.L. & ECON. 805 (1998); Thomas W. Hazlett et al., Was the Fairness Doctrine a
"Chilling Effect"?: Evidence from the Postderegulation Radio Market, 26 J. OF LEGAL STUD.
279 (1997); WALTER M. PRIMEAUX, JR., DIRECT ELECTRIC UTILITY COMPETITION (Praeger
Publishers) (1986); JOHN E. KwOKA, JR., POWER STRUCTURE: OWNERSHIP, INTEGRATION, AND
COMPETITION IN THE U.S. ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY (Kluwer Academic Publishers) (1996);
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In its IP-Enabled Services Notice of Proposed Rulemaking the
FCC notes that monopoly ownership of the public switched telephone
network is the principal reason for much of the economic regulation
that it implements. 142 Conversely, the FCC notes, "[t]o the extent the
market for IP-enabled services is not characterized by such monopoly
conditions, we seek comment on whether there is a compelling
rationale for applying traditional economic regulation to providers of
IP-enabled services."' 143 In a subsequent section, the Commission
inquires "whether any of these economic regulations are appropriate
in the context of IP-enabled services, given that customers often can
obtain these services from multiple,
intermodal, facilities- and non144
facilities-based service providers.,
Given the Commission's assumptions, the answer suggested by
economic research is a resounding "No." The history of
telecommunications, as well as a wide variety of other regulated
industries, suggests that consumers bear significant costs when
145
economic regulation becomes a substitute for competition.
Deregulation
and
competition
in
the
long-distance
telecommunications, airline, railroad, natural gas, and trucking
George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1962); Thomas G. Moore, The Effectiveness of Regulation of Electric Utility
Prices, 36 S. ECON. J. 365 (1970); UNNATURAL MONOPOLIES: THE CASE FOR DEREGULATING
PUBLIC UTILITIES (Robert Poole ed., D.C. Heath and Co., 1985); Jerry Ellig & Michael
Giberson, Scale, Scope, and Regulation in the Texas Gas Transmission Industry, 5 J. OF REG.
ECON. 79 (1993). For discussions of the political influence costs associated with regulation, see
Michael A. Crew & Charles K. Rowley, Toward a Public Choice Theory of Monopoly
Regulation, 57 PUB. CHOICE 49 (1988); JAMES M. BUCHANAN, ROBERT D. TOLLISON, &
GORDON TULLOCK, TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (Texas A&M
University Press) (1980); H.G. Broadman & J.P. Kalt, How Natural is Monopoly? The Case of
Bypass in Natural Gas DistributionMarkets, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 181 (1989); Jerry Ellig, Why
Do Regulators Regulate? The Case of the Southern California Gas Market, 7 J. OF REG. ECON.
293 (1995); Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning PropertyRights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did
FCCLicense Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529 (1998); Thomas W. Hazlett, Oak
Leaves and the Origins of the 1927 Radio Act: Comment, 95 PUB. CHOICE 277 (1998); Thomas
W. Hazlett & Robert J. Michaels, The Cost of Rent-Seeking: Evidence from Cellular Telephone
License Lotteries, 59 S. ECON. J. 425 (1993); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Demand to Regulate
FranchiseMonopoly: Evidencefrom CATV Rate Deregulationin California,29 ECON. INQUIRY
275 (1991).
142. IP-Enabled Services, supra note 2, 5, at 4867.
143.
Id.
144. Id 74, at 4913.
145. For a summary of relevant research, see Clifford Winston, Economic Deregulation:
Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists, 31 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 1263 (1993); Robert
Crandall & Jerry Ellig, Economic Deregulation and Customer Choice: Lessonsfor the Electric
Industry (Center for Market Processes, Fairfax, VA, 1997); Kenneth W. Costello & Robert J.
Graniere, The Deregulation Experience: Lessons for the Electric Power Industry (National
Regulatory Research Institute, Columbus, OH, 1996).
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industries have led to price reductions and other consumer benefits
worth more than 146
$50 billion annually; regulation deprived consumers
of these benefits.

The tone of the NPRM suggests that the FCC is suspicious of
proposals to impose economic regulation on IP-enabled services;
economic research shows that this suspicion is well grounded. The
Commission should be concerned about monopoly in an IP-enabled
service only if such monopoly can be shown to flow from a firm's
pre-existing
monopoly over some
other
part of the
telecommunications network. And in that case, the preferred remedy
should be one that prevents the spread of monopoly to IP-enabled
services, rather than one that substitutes economic regulation for
competition.
VoIP has evolved into a viable alternative to old-fashioned
telephone service. The history of economic regulation suggests that
application of price and entry regulation will hinder this development
and retard the growth of competition in local telecommunications
markets.
2.

Interconnection and access charges

47

Title II regulation requires telecommunications carriers to
interconnect on rates, terms, and conditions that are "just" and
"reasonable."' 148 While many VolP providers would like to
interconnect with the public switched telephone network, the terms
under which they do so are a contentious issue.
A key political problem is that VoIP substitutes for long-distance
service. Long-distance telephone companies pay per-minute access
charges when they interconnect with local telephone companies at
both ends of the call.' 49 There is virtually unanimous agreement
among regulatory economists that historically, these charges have
been used to subsidize local telephone service.150 Since the 1980s, the
146. Crandall & Ellig, supranote 145.
147. The discussion in this section draws heavily on Ellig, IntercarrierCompensation,
supra note 131.
148. 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
149. Ellig, lntercarrierCompensation,supra note 131, at 97.
150. Wayne Leighton, Consumers and Cross-subsidies: An Interest Group Theory of
Telecommunications Regulation (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Mason
University) (on file with author). The argument that long-distance service does not crosssubsidize local service is based on the assumption that local loop costs are "common costs" of
producing long-distance and local service. However, the fact that customers might use local
phone lines for both local and long-distance calls does not mean that local loops are common
costs for the phone companies. A loop provides a customer with access to the
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FCC has gradually reduced access charges and made up the revenues
with the fixed Federal Subscriber Line charge.15'
52
Information service providers are exempt from access charges. 1
Instead, they pay for phone service as business customers.' 53 In so
doing, they help subsidize local residential service, because business
rates (at least for small and medium-size businesses) tend to be much
rates even though the cost of providing the
higher than residential
154
service is similar.
The Commission's Pulver decision holds that a service that helps
its customers make voice calls to each other over the Internet is an
unregulated information service, 155 and hence exempt from access
users with
charges. Other VoIP providers, however, connect their
56
1
network.
telephone
switched
public
the
on
other callers
The current system of access charges is intended to promote
universal service. 157 The assumed public benefit is that more people
subscribe to local phone service because access charge revenues are
used to subsidize monthly local rates. This benefit may address a
market failure, reflecting the internalization of a genuine externality,
under three conditions:
1. The value of telephone service to each subscriber rises when
other subscribers join the network,
2. This increase in value is large enough that current
subscribers would be willing to subsidize these new
subscribers, and
3. Individuals fail to take this increased5 8value into account
when they decide whether to subscribe.1

telecommunications network. The cost of any loop is incremental to the rest of the system, and a
loop receives a subsidy if it does not cover its incremental costs. For a thorough discussion of
theory and evidence, see Steve G. Parsons, Cross-Subsidization in Telecommunications, 13 J.
REG. ECON. 157, 157-82 (1998).
151.

Ellig, Intercarrier Compensation, supra note 131, at 97 n.3.

152.
153.

Id. at 97.
Id.

154.
ROBERT W. CRANDALL & LEONARD WAVERMAN, WHO PAYS FOR UNIVERSAL
SERVICE?, 47 (Brookings Institution Press, 2000).

155. Pulver, supra note 48, 1l,8 at 3307, 3311.
156. IP-Enabled Services, supra note 2, 61-62, at 4904-05.
157. Ellig, Intercarrier Compensation, supra note 131, at 100.
158. The first condition defines the existence of an externality. The second condition
determines whether it is a "Pareto-relevant marginal externality," an often-overlooked
precondition for a subsidy or regulatory action to improve consumer welfare. A.H. Barnett &
David L. Kaserman, The Simple Welfare Economics of Network Externalities and the Uneasy
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Even if these conditions hold, a regulatory response may not be
necessary, because the owner of the network has strong financial
incentives to maximize the value of the network by crafting subsidies
to new subscribers if subsidies are needed to internalize the
externality.159 Alternatively, policymakers may believe that an
increase in telephone connectivity is a good thing even if there is no
externality. 160 Regardless of whether an externality exists, most
research suggests that access charges impose significant costs on
consumers, but the cross-subsidies generate little increase in
telephone subscriptions.' 6 1 It should also be noted that most of the
infrastructure for universal service is already in place, and that
universal service is a reality.162 Furthermore, the recent explosion of
wireless coverage was achieved as a result of reduced prices, not
63
cross-subsidies.1
a.

Access charges generate significant consumer
costs

Because consumer demand for long-distance service is very
responsive to price, access charge policies that inflate the price of
long-distance service generate significant reductions in consumer
welfare. When an artificial price increase leads consumers to cut back
on consumption by a large amount, it makes consumers substantially
worse off.164 Most studies find that the price elasticity of demand for
long-distance service is relatively large, in a range between -0.5 and 0.72; a one percent increase in long-distance prices reduces use by
about one-half to three-quarters of one percent. 65 Hence, longdistance access charges generate relatively large reductions in longdistance usage and consumer welfare.
Case for Subscribership Subsidies, 13 J. OF REG. ECON. 245 (1998).
159. Stanley J. Liebowitz & Steve Margolis, Network Effects, in HANDBOOK OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS 78 (M. Caves, S, Majumdar, & I. Vogelsang eds., 2002).
160. John C. Panzar, A Methodology for Measuring the Costs of Universal Service
Obligations, 12 INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 211 (2000).
161.

Ellig, IntercarrierCompensation,supra note 131, at 101.

162. "[I]n most developed countries, virtually everyone is already connected to the
[telephone] network." Crandall & Waverman, supra note 154, at 27.
163. Robert W. Crandall and Jerry A. Hausman, Competition in U.S. Telecommunications
Services: Effects of the 1996 Legislation, in DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES: WHAT'S

NEXT? 102-07 (Sam Peltzman & Clifford Winston eds., AEI-Brookings Joint Center for
Regulatory Studies 2000).
164. CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 154, at 57-58.
165.
Jerry Hausman & Howard Shelanski, Economic Welfare and Telecommunications
Regulation: The E-Rate Policyfor Universal-Service Subsidies, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 19, 36-37

(1999).
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This reduction in consumption might be offset, to some extent,
by the value of increased consumption of local service made possible
by the cross-subsidies. Consumer decisions to subscribe to telephone
service, however, are not very sensitive to the fixed monthly
charge.'66 In other words, local service has a relatively low price
elasticity of demand, and this elasticity appears to have fallen over
time-perhaps as low as -0.005.167 Surveying the findings of multiple
studies, Jerry Hausman and Howard Shelanski note,
A comparison of price elasticities of demand for local and longdistance telephone services thus reveals that an increase in longdistance prices is probably more harmful to society's economic
welfare than is an increase in local service prices. Long-distance
demand, with a price elasticity of -0.7, will contract substantially
more in the face of a price increase than will local-service demand,
with a price elasticity of -0.005.168
b. Effectiveness of subsidizing localphone service is
questionable
Studies of phoneless households cast further doubt on the idea
that the fixed monthly cost of local service is a key barrier to
telephone subscription. The most common reasons that phoneless
households give for not subscribing to telephone service is concern
about uncontrollable usage-based charges, not the cost of basic local
service. 169 A 1994 study of low-income households in New Jersey
found that the cost of usage-related charges and optional servicessuch as long-distance, collect calls, calling-card calls, and voice
mail-were the most common reasons that households lacked phone
service. 170 Heads of households noted that other family members or
friends living with them had run up large usage-related bills in the
past, often without their knowledge or approval. 7 ' The authors
concluded, "Income, employment, and other measures of wealth or
poverty are strongly related to low penetration not because the price

166. Barnett & Kaserman, supra note 158, at 246; David L. Kaserman, John W. Mayo, &
Joseph E. Flynn, Cross-Subsidization in Telecommunications: Beyond the Universal Service
Fairy Tale, 2 J. REG. ECON. 231, 231-49 (1990).
167. CRANDALL AND WAVERMAN, supra note 154, at 91.
168. Hausman & Shelanski, supra note 165, at 39.
169. Milton L. Mueller & Jorge Reina Schement, Universal Service from the Bottom Up:
A Study of Telephone Penetrationin Camden, New Jersey, 12 INFO. Soc'Y 273, 287 (1996).
170. Id.
171. Id.
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of basic local phone service is too high, but because low-income
users
'1 72
who run up large usage-related bills are unable to cover them."
A 1995 survey of Texas households without telephones found
that about half of them said the cost of local service makes it difficult
to afford a telephone, but about 80 percent said they could afford to
pay $16 per month, the actual average cost of local service in Texas at
the time of the survey. 17 3 The primary barriers to phone service were
the fact that long-distance charges are variable and hence perceived as
harder to control, the cost of reinstallation for people who previously
had service disconnected due to 1nonpayment
of bills, and difficulty in
74
phone.
the
uses
who
controlling
These differing elasticities suggest that cross-subsidies from
long-distance to local service may generate smaller increases in
telephone subscription at the cost of a large reduction in consumer
welfare due to inflated long-distance prices. 175 Estimates of the impact
of cost-based rate rebalancing suggest that complete elimination of
cross-subsidies would, at worst, reduce the number of primary
residential telephone lines in the United States by 1.5 percent. 176 Rural
areas would see subscription fall by less than 5 percent, and often by
much less. Lower long-distance rates, however, would
increase
77
consumer welfare by between $2.5 billion and $7 billion.'
Even the potential reduction in subscribership from elimination
of cross-subsidies may be an illusion. Higher long-distance rates tend
to reduce telephone subscription, since consumers subscribe to local
78
phone service in part so that they can make long-distance calls.
Some studies find that subscription is more sensitive to changes in
long-distance rates than to changes in local rates. 179 Therefore, a
reduction in the cross-subsidy from long-distance to local rates may
actually increase telephone penetration. 80 The principal study
examining these offsetting effects estimated that the reduction in

172. Id.
173. John B. Horrigan & Lodis Rhodes, The Evolution of Universal Service in Texas, Sept.
1995, http://www.apt.org/public-policy/issues/universal-service/the-evolution-of-universal.html.
174.

175.
176.
177.
178.
of AT&T
(1993).

Id.

CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 154, at 112-21.
Id.
Id.
Jerry Hausman, Timothy Tardiff, & Alexander Belinfante, The Effects of the Breakup
on Telephone Penetration in the United States, 83 AM. ECON. REv. 173, 182-83

179.

Id.

180.

Id.
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cross-subsidies that occurred between 1984 and 1990 actually
increased telephone penetration rates by 0.45 percent, bringing
450,000 additional households onto the telephone network.' 8'
Another, more recent study using a variety of statistical techniques
found very little evidence that the cost of monthly service affects
telephone penetration rates; in that case, access charges182generate
consumer costs but simply fail to promote universal service.
In short, the policy of cross-subsidizing local rates with revenues
from long-distance access charges generates little increase in
telephone subscription rates, and may even reduce them. The crosssubsidy is difficult to justify on equity grounds as well. Even in
households with incomes less than $10,000, long-distance accounts
for more than 40 percent of average monthly telephone
expenditures.1 83 In all income classes, long-distance usage is quite
variable, with some households using a lot and some very little. 8 4 It is
thus safe to say that many low-income households use a great deal of
long-distance service, and so the cross-subsidy may actually diminish
the welfare of these households. 185 In addition, the local service
subsidy is not targeted based on income, in marked contrast to the
practice in other regulated utilities, such as electricity and natural
gas. 86 Rich and poor households alike are entitled to one cheap
residential phone line-an odd way of redistributing income to the
poor.187

The FCC's own long-lived initiative to replace access charges
with the fixed monthly Subscriber Line Charge reflects these realities.
Given the ineffectiveness and inequity of cross-subsidies funded by
access charges, a decision to subject VoJP to access charges would
surely harm consumers.
c. A prudent approach
The current access charge system significantly distorts prices and
impairs consumer welfare. The FCC itself appears to have recognized
this in its proceeding on unified intercarrier compensation, which
seeks to replace access charges with less distortionary

181.

Id.

182.

CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supranote 154, at 94-104.

183.

Id. at 57-68.

184.

Id. at 59-61.

185.

Id. at 63.

186.

Id. at 57-68.

187.

Id. at 26, 69-88.
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arrangements. 188 Bringing VoIP under the current access charge
regime might promote competitive neutrality, but it would also
perpetuate the price distortions of the current regime and reduce the
incentives for meaningful reform of intercarrier compensation. If
VolP remains free from access charges, it provides at least some
consumers with an "escape valve" that reduces the inefficiencies
associated with access charges. Leaving VoIP free from access
charges might also make intercarrier compensation reform easier to
achieve, since parties subject to access charges would have strong
incentives to press for a less distortionary system in order to "level the
playing field." These broader, pro-consumer policy goals may well be
worth sacrificing a little short-term competitive neutrality.
In the short term, the most workable way to address the issue
may be to treat VoIP providers as Internet Service Providers for the
purpose of connecting to the public switched telephone network. In
this way, they would help cover the cost of the public switched
telephone network by paying business telephone rates and the Federal
Subscriber Line Charge. Since tariffed business rates tend to be much
higher than residential rates, these service providers would still make
a contribution toward subsidizing residential rates.
In the meantime, the FCC should focus on achieving intercarrier
compensation reforms that would remove hidden cross-subsidies and
reduce the inefficiencies currently associated with universal service
programs. A detailed reform plan is outside the scope of this Article,
but our discussion of the inefficiencies of the current system suggests
several general principles that would enhance consumer welfare:
1. Avoid taxing price-sensitive services to subsidize services
that are not sensitive to price,
2. Recover fixed costs through charges that do not vary with
usage,
3. Eliminate or reduce cross-subsidies,
4. Structure any subsidies that remain to discourage waste and
inefficiency.189

188. In re Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, 16 F.C.C.R. 9610, 2,
at 9611-12 (2001).
189. For a detailed discussion and evaluation of reform plans, see Ellig, Intercarrier
Compensation, supra note 131.
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3. Explicit Universal Service Subsidies
In addition to authorizing access charges on some carriers, the
FCC requires universal service "contributions" from providers of
interstate telecommunications services to subsidize basic phone
service for low-income customers, subsidize high-cost phone
companies, provide reduced-price Internet service to schools and
libraries, and offer reduced-price telecommunications services to rural
health care facilities. 190 Providers typically pass these charges through
to consumers on their bills. For a long time, VoIP providers did not
make contributions to universal service, and due to its low cost,
switching to VoIP has become an easy decision for millions of
Americans.
A major concern in the United States about the growth of VoIP
was that the gradual drain of customers away from traditional
telephone providers would undermine the funding base for universal
service programs.' 91 VoIP uses capacity more efficiently than
traditional telephone service and hence requires much less
infrastructure. 192 Today, VoIP is an emerging competitor to telephone
service, but in the not too distant future it may completely supplant
traditional telecommunications. VoIP appears poised to explode into
people's everyday lives. While VoIP had only reached 400,000 U.S.
homes by 2004, it is projected to reach 12.1 million households by
2009.193 VoIP is materializing at the same time that traditional
telephone companies face stiffening competition from broadband and
wireless. The Baby Bells have lost over 28 million phone lines since
the end of 2000, and the number of residential lines continues to
decline at an annual rate of about 4 percent. 194 This represents the first
1 95
decline in the number of phone lines since the Great Depression.
Considering this decline is occurring at the same time that universal
service fund expenditures are increasing, 196 it came as little surprise

190.
See Jerry Ellig, Costs and Consequences of Federal Telecommunications Regulation,
58 FED. COMM. L.J. 57 (2006) [hereinafter Ellig, Costs and Consequences].
191.

IP-Enabled Services, supra note 2, 63-65, at 4905-07.
192.
R. Alex DuFour, Voice Over Internet Protocol: Ending Uncertainty and Promoting
Innovation through a Regulatory Framework, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 471,477 (2005).
193.

Id. at 476.
194.
Ken Brown & Almar Latour, Heavy Toll: Phone Industry Faces Upheaval as Ways of
Calling ChangeFast, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2004, at Al.

195.
196.

Id.
Universal service expenditures have risen from $4.4 billion in 2000 to $6.5 billion in

2005. In re Universal Service Contribution Methodology, 21 F.C.C.R. 7518,

(2006).

17, at 7527

VOIP REGULATORY STATUS POST-BRAND X

2006]

123

when the FCC extended universal service obligations to VoIP
providers at the end of June 2006.197
To understand the effects on consumer welfare of requiring VoIP
to make universal service contributions, one must understand the
effects of universal service programs on consumer welfare.
a. Universalservice programsare costly to
consumers
The federal government spent approximately $5.4 billion on
universal service programs in 2004.198 More than half of this
money-$3.5 billion-went to subsidize high-cost carriers, and $759
million (14 percent) was spent on programs for low-income
customers that help pay initial connection charges (Linkup) and
subsidize monthly phone bills (Lifeline).1 99 Most of the rest ($1.2
billion, or 22 percent) subsidized Internet service to schools and
libraries. 200 Thus, about 80 percent of the funds were devoted to
subsidizing basic telephone service, with the remainder spent on the
newer "universal service" programs created by the 1996 Telecom Act,
which reduce the cost of Internet service to specified types of
institutions.
The contributions take the form of a percentage assessment
against sales of interstate services-primarily long-distance and
wireless phone services. 20 1 Readjusted quarterly, the universal service
"contribution factor" exceeded 10 percent in 2005.202 Though not
formally called a tax, the assessment has all the economic effects of a
tax. This funding mechanism for universal service programs generates
substantial consumer costs in addition to the revenue it raises to fund
universal service. This occurs because the contribution mechanism

197.
198.

Id. 2, at 7520.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU,
INDUSTRY ANALYSIS AND TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, Trends in Telephone Service, Table 19.1,

www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/trend605.pdf.
[hereinafter Trends in Telephone Service].
199. Id.
200.

(2005)

Id.

201. Public Notice, FCC, Proposed First Quarter 2005 Universal Service Contribution
Factor, 19 F.C.C.R. 24045 (2004); Public Notice, FCC, Proposed Second Quarter 2005
Universal Service Contribution Factor, 20 F.C.C.R. 5239 (2005); Public Notice, FCC, Proposed
Third Quarter 2005 Universal Service Contribution Factor, 20 F.C.C.R. 10727 (2005).
202. Public Notice, FCC, Proposed First Quarter 2005 Universal Service Contribution
Factor, 19 F.C.C.R. 24045 (2004); Public Notice, FCC, Proposed Second Quarter 2005

Universal Service Contribution Factor, 20 F.C.C.R. 5239 (2005); Public Notice, FCC, Proposed
Third Quarter 2005 Universal Service Contribution Factor, 20 F.C.C.R. 10727 (2005).
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acts as a tax on services with relatively high price elasticities of
demand, such as long-distance and wireless. Consequently, the
Commission should exercise caution when considering whether to
require IP-enabled services to make universal service contributions,
because these new services may also have high price elasticities of
demand.
Several studies document the detrimental effects of the current
universal service contribution regime on consumer welfare. MIT
economist Jerry Hausman estimated that the contributions required
from long-distance service to fund discount Internet service for
schools and libraries reduce consumer welfare by approximately 6579 cents for every dollar of revenue raised.20 3 The marginal effectthat is, the effect of additional contributions-is even higher: $1.25
for each additional dollar raised. 2°
It is possible to construct a similar estimate for interstate longdistance using FCC data from the most recent year available, 2002.
For domestic interstate long-distance, federal universal service
contributions averaged 0.8 cents per conversation minute. 20 5 This
price increase raised approximately $2.7 billion in revenues, but it
also reduced consumption of long-distance service.20 6 As a result, the
price increase reduced consumer welfare by about $240 million and
reduced producer welfare by about $920 million, for a total reduction
in economic welfare of $1.16 billion.20 7
Like long-distance service, demand for wireless service is
relatively responsive to price.20 8 In a separate study, Hausman
203.
204.

Hausman & Shelanski, supra note 165, at 42-43.
Jerry Hausman, Taxation Through Telecommunications Regulation, 12 TAX POL'Y &

THE ECON. 22, 31 (1998).

205. See JIM LANDE & KENNETH LYNCH, FCC INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV.,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY
REVENUES
2002,
30-31
tbl. 10
(2004),
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common-Carrier/Reports/FCC-State-Link/IAD/teirevO2.pdf.
(Universal service contribution per interstate domestic conversation minute calculated by
subtracting I cent access cost per interstate conversation minute in 2002 from 1.8 cent total
access and universal service contribution per interstate domestic conversation minute in 2002).
206. $2.7 billion figure is the product of 0.8 cent per minute universal service contribution
times 333.8 billion interstate domestic conversation minutes, as reported. Id.
207. Ellig, Costs and Consequences, supra note 190, at 59 (2006). Although the revenue
figure is larger than Hausman's estimate in 1998, the effects on economic welfare are smaller
than he calculated because this study uses average figures derived from an estimate of the joint
effects of interstate long-distance access charges and universal service contributions. Hausman's
figures are estimates of the marginal effect of adding the universal service contributions on top
of existing access charges. Since the efficiency loss associated with raising additional dollars
exceeds the average efficiency loss, Hausman's marginal figures are higher. Id. at 59 n.70.
208. Jerry Hausman, Cellular Telephone, New Products,and the CPI, 17 J. BUS. & ECON.
STAT. 188, 191 (1999).
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estimated the impact on the economy of all taxes applied to wireless,
including the universal service contributions imposed by the
Commission. 20 9 He calculated that every dollar raised generated an
excess burden of approximately 53 cents, which implies that wireless
taxes cost the economy $2.56 billion annually in addition to the $4.79
billion raised annually in the late 1990S.210 Additional taxes or
contributions would, on average, entail a cost of 72 cents for each
dollar of revenue raised.21'
An adaptation of Hausman's method permits an estimate of the
effects of wireless universal service contributions in more recent
years. Universal service assessments on interstate wireless service
raised approximately $1.76 billion in 2004.212 These assessments
created a consumer welfare loss of $48 million and a producer
welfare loss of $930 million, for a total reduction in economic welfare
of $978 million.2 13
These efficiency costs are far below those estimated for other,
more general forms of taxation, which usually involve a reduction in
output (or "excess burden") of 25-40 cents per dollar raised. 2 14 And
they are positively huge compared with the impact on consumer
welfare of an alternative regulatory policy-paying for the subsidy
through a flat rate charge like the Subscriber Line Charge. Since the
price elasticity of demand for local telephone service is very low, the
excess burden associated with an increased flat rate charge is
approximately 6/100ths of a cent per dollar raised.215
Like long-distance access charges, contributions from longdistance and wireless appear to be a very expensive means of funding
traditional universal service subsidies for telephone service. Whether
contributions from VoIP would generate similar reductions in
consumer welfare depends on VoIP subscribership and the elasticity
of demand. To the best of our knowledge, no studies have yet
estimated the elasticity of demand for VoIP. If consumers mostly
view VoIP as a substitute for long-distance service, then it may have a

209.
Jerry Hausman, Efficiency Effects on the U.S. Economy from Wireless Taxation, 53
NAT'L TAX J. 733 (2000).

210.

Id. at 735.

211.

Id.

212.

See generally Trends in Telephone Service, supra note 198 (multiplying total

universal
providers
213.
214.
215.

service outlays in tbl.19.1 by the percentage of contributions from wireless service
in tbl. 19.15).
Ellig, Costs and Consequences,supra note 190, at 60.
See Hausman, supra note 209.
Id. at 740.
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similar elasticity of demand (-0.7), and universal service contributions
from VoIP would generate welfare losses similar to those generated
by contributions from long-distance service. If VoIP largely
substitutes for second phone lines, then the elasticity of demand may
be closer to that for a second phone line, which ranges between -0.35
and -0.59. 2 16 This elasticity is somewhat lower than for long-distance
service but still large enough to generate some substantial welfare
losses.
Finally, if VoIP's elasticity of demand is similar to the elasticity
of demand for wireless minutes, then it would be substantially higher
and lead to even bigger welfare losses. Studies that estimate wireless
demand employing minutes of use as the dependent variable yield
much higher elasticities, between -1.12 and -1.29 using domestic U.S.
data and between -1.71 and -3.62 using international data.2 17
Universal service charges on wireless generate large consumer
welfare losses because they are calculated as a percentage of
revenues, the price of a wireless plan varies based on the number of
minutes purchased, and the demand for wireless minutes is very
price-sensitive. VoIP for domestic calls is usually priced at a flat
monthly rate, with international calls charged on a per-minute basis.
The FCC decided to collect universal service charges from VoIP as a
percentage of interstate and international revenues. Ultimately, this
decision is likely to raise the monthly subscription price for VoIP, but
it may also increase the per-minute price of international calls.
Therefore, it will likely generate the largest consumer welfare losses
on international calls, if VolP providers decide to increase per-minute
international charges.
b. Effectiveness of universalservice programs is
questionable
The universal service programs might enhance overall consumer
welfare if they effectively remedy a market failure. As discussed
above, it is questionable whether any significant market failure still
216. James Eisner & Tracy Waldon, The Demand for Bandwidth: Second Telephone Lines
and On-line Services, 13 INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 301, 308 (2001); Kevin T. Duffy-Deno,
Demand for Additional Telephone Lines: An Empirical Note, 13 INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 283,

295, 298 (2001).
217. See J. Gregory Sidak, Is State Taxation of the Wireless Industry Counterproductive?,
CRITERION
ECONOMICS
(2003)
(using
1999-2001
U.S.
data),
http://www.criterioneconomics.com/docs/sidak_pacificresearch.pdf;
Thomas W. Hazlett &
Roberto E. Mufloz, A Welfare Analysis of Spectrum Allocation Policies, AEl-Brookings Joint
Center for Regulatory Studies Related Publication 04-18, 15, Aug. 2004, http://www.aeibrookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=1024.
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exists that these programs are capable of addressing. Even if there is a
market failure, independent research often shows that the universal
service programs, in practice, do not provide a cost-effective remedy.
While the universal service programs clearly transfer large amounts
of money between different groups of users, the extent to which they
promote universal service by actually increasing subscribership is
much less clear.
A 1997 study using data from the 1990 Decennial Census found
that expenditures on Lifeline and Linkup programs increase telephone
penetration, but by very small amounts.2 18 A 10 percent increase in
expenditures would lead to less than a one tenth of one percent
increase in the telephone penetration rate.219 Similarly, a more recent
study estimated that the Lifeline and Linkup programs increase total
subscribership by about 0.155 percent. 2 One of the most extensive
recent studies found that monthly charges have no influence on
telephone penetration rates, and Linkup programs sometimes increase
and sometimes decrease penetration, depending on the data set used
to estimate the relationship.22 1
The high-cost support programs, which account for more than
half of the universal service fund's expenditures, appear to be a much
more costly way of increasing subscribership. The most recent study
on this topic estimates that the cost of adding one subscriber through
loop support was at least $11,000 in 2000, up from $3350 in 1990.222
The cost of adding one subscriber through local switching support
was $5155, up from approximately $2000 in 1990.223 These figures
are substantially higher than the $1899 cost of adding a subscriber via
Lifeline and Linkup.224 Other studies employing 2000 data find that
high-cost support programs add subscribers at even higher cost, in the
neighborhood of $20,000 per subscriber.22 5 This cost is substantially
higher than the $666 estimated by another study for 1985-93.226
218.
Christopher Garbacz & Herbert G. Thompson, Jr., Assessing the Impact of FCC
Lifeline and Link-Up Programson Telephone Penetration,11 J. REG. ECON. 67 (1997).
219.

Id. at 77.

220. Daniel J. Ryan, Universal Telephone Service and Rural America 18 (April 30, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
221. CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supranote 154, at 94-104.
222. Ryan, supra note 220, at 18-19.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Christopher Garbacz & Herbert G. Thompson, Jr., Estimating Telephone Demand
with State Decennial Census Datafrom 1970-1990: Update with 2000 Data, 24 J. REG. ECON.

373, 377 (2003).
226. R.C. Eriksson, D.L. Kaserman, & J.W. Mayo, Targeted and Untargeted Subsidy
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These research results suggest that the current universal service
contribution regime generates substantial consumer costs while doing
little to expand access or subscribership. The most cost-effective
program that some studies indicate may increase subscribershipLinkup-is targeted at low-income households and accounts for a
small percentage of the funds.22 7 The schools and libraries program is
targeted in the sense that it gives lower discounts to wealthier
institutions, but it is not clear whether this program has actually
induced more schools and libraries to obtain Internet access.
Consequently, a Commission decision to impose universal service
contributions on IP-enabled services likely would cost consumers a
great deal while doing little to actually increase subscribership either
to basic telephone service or to Internet service.
c.

The special case of VoIP that connects with the
rest of the telephone network

One might agree with this assessment yet nevertheless suggest
that competitive neutrality justifies collecting universal service
contributions from providers of VoIP that connect with the public
switched telephone network. This kind of service has the potential to
compete most directly with conventional telephone service.
The competitive neutrality issue raises precisely the same types
of concerns discussed above in regard to access charges. The current
funding regime for universal service significantly distorts prices and
impairs consumer welfare. Extending this regime to some providers
of VoIP might appear to create a "level playing field" between some
of the competitors, but it would do so at significant cost to consumers.
Indeed, it is not even clear what the quest to make universal
service policy reflect "competitive neutrality" means in a context
where competitors employ widely differing technologies with
different implications for the universal service programs. The
competitive neutrality argument seems to assume that providers of
VoIP would compete only for customers on low-cost telephone loops
who are currently net contributors to universal service funding.
Unlike conventional wireline telephony, however, VoIP has the
potential to serve customers in a wide variety of locations at

Schemes: Evidence from PostdivestitureEfforts to Promote Universal Telephone Service, 41
J.L. & ECON. 477, 498 (1998). This study uses data only for the Bell telephone companies,

which receive a small portion of total high-cost support and may not be typical.
227. "About ... 1.7 million Link-Up beneficiaries received one-time payments averaging
$18.13." Ellig, Costs and Consequences, supra note 190, at 62.
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approximately the same cost, provided that they already have the
requisite Internet connection. That connection could be cable,
wireless, or broadband over power lines.
For this reason, VoIP could ultimately reduce the need for
universal service subsidies. In the absence of subsidies, traditional
service cannot always economically service rural communities. The
long distances, few subscribers, and extensive infrastructure
demanded considerable investment, with few subscribers to pay for
it.228 However, the nature of VoIP raises the prospect that rural
customers can be served profitably without cross-subsidies. VoIP is
available at uniform prices nationwide. As long as the user has a
broadband connection, he or she can get unlimited VoIP service for
about $25 a month. 229 One of the best-known providers offers
unlimited local and long-distance calling within the United States,
Canada, and Puerto Rico for $24.99 per month, or 500 any-distance
minutes for $14.99.230 Wireless ISPs are already providing Internet
access in rural areas without subsidies and making money doing it.
Therefore, while VoIP penetration may have initially eroded funding
231
for the universal service program, it may also reduce the need for it.
Some years from now, the FCC's decision to require universal service
contributions from VoIP could look premature.
4.

Law Enforcement and Public Safety

Other "public interest" arguments may be raised in favor of
regulating VoIP center on law enforcement and public safety issues.
These types of regulations generate significant costs for consumers
when applied to traditional and wireless telephony, and decision
that consumers receive benefits
makers would do well to ensure
2 32
commensurate with the costs.

228. DuFour, supra note 192, at 494.
229. See http://www.vonage.com.
230. Id.
231. See DuFour, supra note 192, at 496-97.
232. See Ellig, Costs and Consequences, supra note 190, at 76 (calculates that wiretapping
regulations increase the cost to consumers of wireless service by $491 million annually, reduce
consumer welfare by an additional $13 million annually, and reduce producer welfare by $260
million annually, with no hard evidence of consumer or social benefits), 73 (calculates that
enhanced 911 requirements increase the cost to consumers of wireless service by $1.25 billion
annually, reduce consumer welfare by an additional $34 million annually, and reduce producer
welfare by $659 million annually, with some evidence of significant benefits in the form of
reduced mortality for cardiac patients and reduced hospital costs).
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The principal law enforcement concern is that VoIP may not be
susceptible to wiretaps.23 3 However, this fear is unjustified. The
emergence of broadband telephony has not altered the FBI's ability to
seek court-sanctioned surveillance. Vonage has already been served
with subpoenas for call records and call data. 34 Since all of the calls
go through a central server, Vonage need only copy the stream of data
as it passes through and feed the copies to law enforcement.23 5 In fact,
while some have worried that law enforcement may not be able tap
VoIP phones, others have expressed concern that VoIP phones may
be too easy to tap. 236
While concerns about the ability of law enforcement to tap VoIP
phones appear to have been unfounded, the portability of VoIP
phones could bring some services into conflict with section 103 of the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA),2 37
which requires telecommunications carriers to establish the capability
of providing law enforcement reasonably available call-identifying
information (CII), pursuant to a court order or other lawful
authorization. 23 CALEA defines CII as "dialing or signaling
information that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or
termination of each communication generated or received by a
subscriber by means of any equipment, facility, or service of a
telecommunications carrier., 239 On May 12, 2006, the FCC released
an opinion and order requiring VolP providers to be section 103
compliant by May 14, 2007.40 While the deadline may seem short,
the FCC noted that "VoIP standards for CALEA are nearing or are at
completion for various technologies. Thus, manufacturers and carriers
are in a good position to implement and deploy solutions for VoIP by
that date.",24 ' Therefore, as shall be seen shortly with 911 service,
233. Paula K. Royalty, When is a Phone Call not a Phone Call? Legal Issues Arisingfrom
Business Use of VolP, I SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 1,
1 (2004), available at
http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/voll/a001Royalty.html.
234. Id. at 23.
235. Id.
236. See Daniel B. Garrie, Matthew J. Armstrong, & Donald P. Harris, Voice over Internet
Protocol and the Wiretap Act: Is Your Conversation Protected?, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 97,
106-07 (2005).
237. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in sections of 18
U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.).
238. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(l)-(2) (2000).
239. 47 U.S.C. § 100 1(2) (2000).
240. In re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access
and Services (Second Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order), 21 F.C.C.R.
5360, 1 (2006).
241.
Id. 17, at 5367.
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public safety and law enforcement concerns about VolP can be
addressed on an individual basis without resorting to blanket Title II
regulation. CALEA is, of course, a completely separate piece of
legislation.
In addition to wiretaps, concerns have also been raised about the
ability of VoIP callers to reach 911 services.2 42 Depending on the way
that the VolP provider connects with the public switched telephone
network, a VolP subscriber who dials 911 might be connected with a
police or fire department's office instead of a 911 operator.243 The
mobility of VolP creates an additional quandary for enhanced 911
service, which is supposed to tell the emergency operator the caller's
location. 2 " Since VoIP equipment will usually work with any
broadband connection, VolP subscribers can move their telephones
from one location to another.245
The Federal Communications Commission recently required
VolP providers to supply 911 services.246 VolP providers have
initially managed this by simply having subscribers register where
they would be making their calls from.24 7 Registration can be changed
easily and updated within hours of moving. 248 Additional software
may soon be available to make this unnecessary, and Vonage has
negotiated E911 deals with three out of the four Baby Bells. 249 While
the regulatory hand has been light, VolP providers have still managed
to resolve regulatory issues without the imposition of Title II.
VI. CONCLUSION
The FCC should classify VolP as an information service, for
several reasons. First, it works like an information service. Second,

242. In re IP-Enabled Services E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers, First
Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 10245, 25, at 10259
(2005).
243. Id. 12, at 10250-51.
244. Id. 25, at 10259-60.
245. Id.
246. See ld. 1, at 10246.
247. Vonage.com provides a good description of the complete process. See
http://www.vonage.com/help.php?article=394.
248. Id.
249. As of May 2005, Vonage had purchased E911 access from Verizon, SBC, and
BellSouth. Vonage predicts that it will be able to provide 911 service on par with that traditional
telephone service by the end of 2005. Once E911 is completely rolled out, even nomadic
broadband telephones will return the caller's location and call back number. Press Release,
Vonage, Vonage Agrees with SBC and BellSouth to Purchase Nomadic VolP E9-1-1 Service
(May 19, 2005), http://www.vonage.com/media/pdf/pr_05_ 9 05.pdf.
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the congressional intent underlying the 1996 Telecommunications Act
clearly contemplates replacing regulation with competition. Viewed
in that light, imposing old-fashioned common carrier regulation on
VolP would stand congressional intent on its head, for VolP is
precisely the type of new competitive option that the Telecom sought
to encourage. Third, imposition of Title II common carrier regulation
would have a substantial negative effect on consumer welfare.
There seems to be little justification for imposing price or entry
regulation on VolP, or for using access charges to create hidden
subsidies. A stronger case might be made for including VolP under a
reformed universal service system or imposing certain public safety
obligations. The FCC actually did both of those things subsequent to
issuing the Notice on IP-Enabled services -though
without
reforming universal service first.
Even if some aspects of regulation might be socially or
politically desirable, that does not mean that VoIP should be subject
to Title II regulation. The FCC has demonstrated that it can impose
universal service and public safety obligations on a piecemeal basis
under other provisions of the Communications Act. 250 In a 2005
decision, the FCC simply ordered DSL providers to contribute to the
Universal Service Fund.25 1 This came despite the fact that the FCC
maintained that wireline broadband Internet access service was an
information service.252 In its 911 order, the FCC cited its Title I
general provision purpose "of promoting safety of life and property
through the use of wire and radio communication.' 253 Since the
Commission has declined to classify VolP as either a
telecommunications or information system, it declined to impose 911
250. The FCC used both the authority granted it under section 254(d) of the
Communications Act, which created the universal service program, and its ancillary Title I
powers as legal foundations for its extension of universal service obligations to VolP providers.
However, the FCC was very careful to limit the application of Title II to universal service and
explicitly stated that the telecommunications/information service distinction remained
unresolved. See In re Universal Service Contribution Methodology, 21 F.C.C.R. 7518, 38, at
7538, 46, at 7541-42, 35, at 7537 (2006).
251. In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet over Wireline
Facilities and Universal Service Obligations of Broadband Providers, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, 113,
at 14915-16 (2005).
252. Id. 12, at 14862.
253. In re IP-Enabled Services E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers, First
Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 10245, 29, at 10262
(2005) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 151). They also cited the Wireless Communications and Public
Safety Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-81, 113 Stat. 1286, § 2(b) (1999) (911 Act) (to "encourage
and facilitate the prompt deployment throughout the United States of a seamless, ubiquitous, and
reliable end-to-end infrastructure."). Id. 4, at 10247.
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or E911 through its Title II powers, but instead relied upon its
ancillary authority granted by Title 1.254 Public interest arguments and
cost-benefit analysis may demonstrate that these mandates are
worthwhile, but they provide no reason that VoIP should be classified
as telecommunications. Using them as reasons for blanket Title II
regulation ignores the fact that their ends may be achieved without the
remainder of Title II. By declaring VoIP an information service, the
FCC could free it from some of the most costly and least relevant
aspects of common carrier regulation while reserving the right to
regulate selectively when it believes circumstances warrant.
If VoIP is regulated like a telecommunications service from its
infancy, innovation will be stifled and the cost to consumers will be
high. Conversely, if VolP is regulated like an information service, the
service will grow rapidly, and consumers will benefit from this
competitive option. 255 Denying cheaper services and more choices in
telecommunications to customers was definitely not the congressional
intent behind the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Classifying VoIP
as an information service is not just the legal thing to do, but also the
right thing to do.
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Id. 22, at 10256.
DuFour, supra note 192, at 473.
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